Scenario
The French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rousseau, presented the following situation. Two hunters can either jointly hunt a stag (an adult deer and rather large meal) or individually hunt a rabbit (tasty, but substantially less filling). Hunting stags is quite challenging and requires mutual cooperation. If either hunts a stag alone, the chance of success is minimal. Hunting stags is most beneficial for society but requires a lot of trust among its members.Description
There are two pure strategy equilibria. Both players prefer one equilibrium to the other - it is both Pareto optimal and Hicks optimal. However, the inefficient equilibrium is less risky as the payoff variance over the other player's strategies is lower. Specifically, one equilibrium is payoff-dominant while the other is risk-dominant.Example
Hunter 2 | |||
stag | rabbit | ||
Hunter 1 | stag | 10,10 | 0,8 |
rabbit | 8,0 | 7,7 |
General Form
Player 2 | |||
L | R | ||
Player 1 | U | a,w | b,x |
D | c,y | d,z |
a > c >= d > b
w > x >= z > y
updated: 12 August 2005
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© Mike Shor 2001-2006
© Mike Shor 2001-2006