Description
The simplest of William Poundstone's social dilemmas in which the each player has a dominant strategy and the equilibrium is Pareto optimal. The only thing qualifying it as a social dilemma is the arbitrary assignment of labels to the strategies. Similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma, each player hopes for the other to cooperate, but neither does. However, unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma, the resulting equilibrium is Pareto optimal.Example
Player 2 | |||
cooperate | defect | ||
Player 1 | cooperate | 1,1 | 0,3 |
defect | 3,0 | 2,2 |
General Form
Player 2 | |||
L | R | ||
Player 1 | U | a,w | b,x |
D | c,y | d,z |
c>d>a>b
x>z>w>y
updated: 12 August 2005
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© Mike Shor 2001-2006
© Mike Shor 2001-2006